Every construction site in New York is supposed to follow the Industrial Code. The planking, the guardrails, the slope of a ladder, the depth of a trench. The rules are specific and they exist for a reason.
When a contractor or owner ignores those rules and a worker gets hurt, Labor Law § 241(6) gives that worker a claim against them. Not your employer. The parties up the chain who controlled how the job was supposed to be done.
The cases that win are the cases where the right Industrial Code provision is identified and the violation is documented. We do that work on every construction injury case that comes through the office.
The full text of Labor Law § 241(6) provides that "[a]ll areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places." The statute then directs the Commissioner of Labor to promulgate rules establishing specific safety standards.
Those rules are the Industrial Code, found at 12 NYCRR Part 23. The Code contains hundreds of specific provisions governing everything from the load capacity of scaffolds to the minimum width of planking to the distance between ladder rungs. When an owner or contractor violates one of these specific provisions and a worker is injured, § 241(6) provides the statutory basis for recovery.
The statute creates a duty that runs with the construction project. Property owners cannot disclaim it through contractual arrangements, and general contractors cannot delegate it to subcontractors. The obligation is to ensure compliance with the Industrial Code at the site level, regardless of which entity is actually performing the work.
Section 241(6) imposes a non-delegable duty on specific categories of defendants. The same parties liable under § 240 are liable here, but with one critical difference: comparative negligence is available as a defense, meaning a jury can apportion fault to the injured worker and reduce the damages accordingly.
Section 241(6) does not create liability on its own. It works as a conduit: the statute establishes the duty, and the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR Part 23) supplies the specific standards that define the duty's scope. A § 241(6) claim requires the plaintiff to identify a specific Industrial Code provision that was violated and that caused or contributed to the injury.
Not every Industrial Code provision supports a § 241(6) claim. In Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 N.Y.2d 494, 1993), the Court of Appeals held that the cited provision must set forth a specific, positive command rather than a general safety standard. A rule requiring that "ichardous areas shall be adequately guarded" is too general. A rule specifying that "scaffold planks shall be at least two inches thick" is sufficiently specific. The specificity determination is a threshold legal question for the court.
The most commonly cited provisions include 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (protection from general hazards including tripping, slipping, and falling object dangers), 12 NYCRR 23-1.16 (safety belts, harnesses, tail lines, and lifelines), 12 NYCRR 23-1.21 (ladders and ladderways), and 12 NYCRR 23-5 (scaffolding). Each of these sections contains dozens of sub-provisions, some specific enough to support a claim and some too general.
In Misicki v. Caradonna (12 N.Y.3d 511, 2009), the Court of Appeals clarified that the specificity analysis must be applied to individual subdivisions within a regulatory section, not to the section as a whole. A provision that is general in one subdivision may be specific in another. Identifying the right subdivision, at the right level of specificity, is the determinative step in building a § 241(6) case.
Three Court of Appeals decisions define the framework for § 241(6) litigation. Together they establish what counts as a predicate Industrial Code violation, how to evaluate specificity, and how broadly the statute's construction-work requirement applies.
Ross established that a § 241(6) claim requires the plaintiff to identify an Industrial Code provision that sets forth a specific, positive command rather than a general safety standard. The Court held that only provisions prescribing a specific standard of conduct can serve as predicates for § 241(6) liability. This decision created the specificity framework that governs every § 241(6) case in New York.
Misicki refined the specificity analysis by holding that courts must examine individual subdivisions of an Industrial Code section rather than the section as a whole. A subdivision containing a specific command supports a § 241(6) claim even if neighboring subdivisions in the same section are too general. This decision resolved confusion in the lower courts about the proper unit of analysis for the Ross specificity test.
Rizzuto confirmed that § 241(6) applies broadly to activities that constitute construction work under the statute. The Court held that the statutory duty extends to all work reasonably characterized as construction, demolition, or excavation, and that the owner's non-delegable duty to comply with the Industrial Code cannot be shifted to subcontractors through contractual arrangements or site safety plans.
The most common defense in § 241(6) cases is a specificity challenge. Defendants argue that the cited Industrial Code provision is too general to support a claim under the Ross framework. If the provision states a broad safety objective rather than a specific, measurable standard, the court will dismiss the § 241(6) cause of action predicated on that provision. Choosing the right provision at the outset is essential.
Defendants also raise the construction-context requirement. In Nagel v. D&R Realty Corp. (99 N.Y.2d 98, 2002), the Court of Appeals held that § 241(6) only applies when the injury occurs in the context of construction, demolition, or excavation work. Routine maintenance performed outside a construction project does not trigger the statute. Defendants routinely argue that the plaintiff was performing maintenance, not construction, to defeat the claim at the threshold.
Unlike § 240, comparative negligence is a valid defense under § 241(6). A jury can assign a percentage of fault to the injured worker and reduce the damages award proportionally. If the jury finds the worker 30% at fault, the recovery is reduced by 30%. This does not eliminate the claim entirely (New York follows pure comparative negligence), but it can substantially reduce the damages awarded.
Finally, defendants argue that the specific Industrial Code provision was not actually violated on the facts. Even if the provision is sufficiently specific under Ross, the defendant can present evidence that the site conditions complied with the cited rule. This becomes a factual dispute for the jury rather than a legal question for the court.
A successful § 241(6) claim entitles the injured worker to the full range of personal injury damages: past and future medical expenses, past and future lost earnings, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and any permanent disability or disfigurement. The availability of these damages makes a § 241(6) claim substantially more valuable than workers' compensation benefits alone.
Workers' compensation provides immediate medical coverage and a statutory fraction of lost wages, but it does not compensate for pain and suffering or full earning capacity loss. A § 241(6) case runs alongside the workers' comp claim as a separate third-party action. Under Workers' Compensation Law § 29, the worker may pursue both simultaneously. The comp carrier holds a lien on the third-party recovery under WCL § 11, which must be resolved in any settlement or verdict.
Because comparative negligence applies under § 241(6), the jury's fault allocation directly reduces the damages award. A worker found 25% at fault recovers 75% of the total damages. New York's pure comparative negligence rule means even a worker found 90% at fault still recovers 10% of damages. This differs from Labor Law § 240, where comparative negligence is not a defense at all, and from Labor Law § 200, where the plaintiff must also prove the defendant's negligence or notice of a dangerous condition.
When someone calls Schwartzapfel Holbrook after a construction site injury, the first step is determining which Industrial Code provisions apply to the specific conditions that caused the accident. This is the most consequential decision in a § 241(6) case, because the wrong provision (one that is too general under Ross) means the claim fails at the summary judgment stage. We map the accident facts against the Industrial Code before filing.
Our investigation focuses on site conditions and regulatory compliance. We obtain OSHA logs, site safety plans, daily inspection reports, and photographs of the conditions that existed at the time of the accident. We retain safety experts who can testify to the specific Industrial Code requirements that applied and how the site conditions deviated from those requirements.
We coordinate the § 241(6) claim with the parallel workers' compensation case. The comp claim provides immediate medical treatment and wage replacement. The third-party § 241(6) case pursues the full damages that comp does not cover. These two proceedings run on different tracks with different deadlines, and we manage both to protect the worker's overall recovery.
The firm reviews the injured worker's medical records to document the full scope of the injury and its impact on future earning capacity. We do not coordinate with treating physicians or direct medical care. Our role is to ensure the medical evidence supports the damages claim and that the worker's losses are fully documented for trial preparation.
Labor Law § 241(6) is a New York statute that requires property owners and general contractors to comply with the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR Part 23) when construction, demolition, or excavation work is performed on their property. When a specific Industrial Code provision is violated and a worker is injured as a result, the owner and contractor are liable for the resulting damages. The statute creates a non-delegable duty, meaning the obligation cannot be transferred to subcontractors through contractual arrangements.
Section 241(6) covers injuries arising from violations of specific Industrial Code provisions during construction, demolition, or excavation work. Unlike § 240, which is limited to gravity-related hazards, § 241(6) applies to any hazard addressed by a sufficiently specific Industrial Code rule. This includes trip-and-fall hazards, inadequate lighting, improperly stored materials, unguarded floor openings, defective scaffolding, and many other conditions regulated by 12 NYCRR Part 23.
The two statutes differ in scope and in available defenses. Section 240 covers gravity-related hazards and imposes absolute liability, meaning comparative negligence is not a defense. Section 241(6) covers any hazard addressed by a specific Industrial Code provision, regardless of whether gravity is involved, but allows comparative negligence as a defense. A worker found partially at fault under § 241(6) has their damages reduced proportionally. Many construction accident cases assert claims under both statutes.
The Industrial Code is a set of detailed safety regulations promulgated by the New York Commissioner of Labor and codified at 12 NYCRR Part 23. It establishes specific standards for construction site safety, covering scaffolding, ladders, trench shoring, personal protective equipment, illumination, material storage, and dozens of other topics. These are the rules that give § 241(6) its substance, because the statute requires compliance with the Code rather than establishing its own safety standards.
Only violations of Industrial Code provisions that are sufficiently specific under the Ross v. Curtis-Palmer framework support a § 241(6) claim. A provision that sets forth a concrete, measurable standard (such as requiring scaffold planks of a minimum thickness) qualifies. A provision stating a general safety objective (such as requiring "adequate" protection) does not. Common predicate provisions include 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (hazard protection), 23-1.16 (harnesses and lifelines), 23-1.21 (ladders), and 23-5 (scaffolding).
Any worker injured during construction, demolition, or excavation work on a property can bring a § 241(6) claim if a specific Industrial Code provision was violated. This includes employees of subcontractors, independent contractors performing manual labor, and undocumented workers. The statute protects persons "employed therein or lawfully frequenting" the construction area. Immigration status and employment classification do not affect the right to bring a claim.
Property owners and general contractors are liable under § 241(6), along with their statutory agents. The injured worker's direct employer is not liable under § 241(6). Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer.
§ 241(6) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and general contractors to comply with the Industrial Code. The duty cannot be shifted to a subcontractor or to a safety professional hired by the owner or GC. If an Industrial Code provision was violated and that violation caused the injury, the owner and GC are liable regardless of who actually committed the violation.
Yes. Unlike § 240, comparative negligence is a valid defense in § 241(6) cases. If the jury finds you partially at fault for your injury, your damages award is reduced by your percentage of fault. New York follows pure comparative negligence, so even a worker found 90% at fault still recovers 10% of the total damages. Your negligence reduces but never eliminates a valid § 241(6) claim.
Yes. Demolition is one of the three categories of work expressly covered by § 241(6), along with construction and excavation. Workers performing demolition are protected by the statute's requirement that all work areas be equipped and guarded in compliance with the Industrial Code. If a specific Industrial Code provision was violated during demolition work and you were injured as a result, the property owner and general contractor are liable.
Yes. Excavation is expressly listed in § 241(6) alongside construction and demolition. The Industrial Code contains specific provisions governing excavation work, including requirements for shoring, bracing, and sheeting of trenches and excavations. Workers injured during excavation due to a violation of these specific provisions can recover under § 241(6). Trench collapses and cave-ins are common fact patterns in excavation-related § 241(6) claims.
Renovation work is typically covered by § 241(6) because it constitutes construction work within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeals has interpreted "construction" broadly under the Labor Law. If the renovation involves physical alteration of the building's structure or systems, it qualifies. The analysis turns on the nature of the work actually being performed rather than the label given to the overall project.
In the context of § 241(6), "specific" means the Industrial Code provision sets forth a concrete, positive command that prescribes a particular standard of conduct. Ross v. Curtis-Palmer established this requirement. A rule requiring guardrails at a defined height is specific. A rule requiring "adequate" protection is not. The specificity determination is a question of law for the court, and it is analyzed at the level of individual subdivisions within a regulatory section (Misicki v. Caradonna).
The general contractor is liable under § 241(6) when an Industrial Code violation on the site caused an injury to a covered worker. The GC's liability does not require proof that the GC personally caused or knew about the violation.
This is a meaningful difference from § 200, where the GC's liability typically requires proof of supervisory control or notice. Under § 241(6), the GC's responsibility for code compliance on the project is built into the statute.
The property owner is liable under § 241(6) when an Industrial Code violation on the site caused an injury to a covered worker. The owner's liability does not depend on whether the owner had any direct involvement in the construction work.
The same homeowner exception that limits § 240 liability also applies to § 241(6). Owners of one- and two-family dwellings who do not direct or control the work are not subject to § 241(6) liability.
The homeowner exception applies to § 241(6) the same way it applies to § 240. Owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for work but do not direct or control it are not liable under § 241(6).
The exception requires both elements. A two-family dwelling owner who supervises the contractor or controls how the job is performed loses the protection. So does the owner of any property with three or more residential units, or any commercial property, regardless of supervisory involvement.
The statute of limitations for a § 241(6) claim is three years from the date of the accident under CPLR § 214. If the property is owned by a government entity (a municipality, public authority, or state agency), you must file a Notice of Claim within 90 days of the accident under General Municipal Law § 50-e before commencing suit. Missing either deadline bars the claim regardless of its merits.
Yes. Many construction accident cases assert claims under both statutes. A worker who falls from a scaffold, for example, may have a § 240 claim based on the gravity-related hazard and a § 241(6) claim based on a specific scaffolding provision in the Industrial Code. The two claims have different liability standards and different available defenses. Asserting both maximizes the worker's legal position.
Generally no. The Court of Appeals held in Nagel v. D&R Realty Corp. (99 N.Y.2d 98, 2002) that § 241(6) requires a construction, demolition, or excavation context. Routine maintenance performed outside the scope of a construction project does not trigger the statute. If the work is part of an ongoing construction or renovation project, it is covered. If it is standalone maintenance unrelated to construction, it is not.
You can recover the full range of personal injury damages: past and future medical expenses, past and future lost earnings and earning capacity, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent disability or disfigurement. These damages exceed what workers' compensation provides. However, because comparative negligence applies, your total recovery is reduced by your percentage of fault as determined by the jury.
A § 241(6) claim is a third-party action filed in court against the property owner and general contractor. It runs alongside the workers' compensation claim, which is filed with the Workers' Compensation Board against your employer's insurer. Workers' comp provides immediate medical coverage and partial wage replacement. The § 241(6) case pursues full damages including pain and suffering. Under WCL § 29, you may pursue both. The comp carrier's lien under WCL § 11 must be addressed in any recovery.
Yes. Immigration status does not affect your right to bring a § 241(6) claim. New York courts have consistently held that undocumented workers have the same Labor Law protections as any other worker. The statute protects persons performing construction, demolition, or excavation work regardless of immigration status. Your status is generally inadmissible at trial and irrelevant to the liability determination.
Section 241(6) creates liability based on violation of a specific Industrial Code provision. The plaintiff identifies the violated provision and establishes that the violation caused the injury. Section 200 codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, requiring the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant controlled the means and methods of the work or that the defendant had notice of a dangerous condition. Section 200 is a negligence standard. Section 241(6) is a regulatory-violation standard.
Industrial Code Rule 23 refers to 12 NYCRR Part 23, the safety regulations for construction, demolition, and excavation operations in New York. Part 23 contains detailed provisions governing scaffolding, ladders, personal protective equipment, excavation shoring, demolition procedures, material handling, and dozens of other topics. These are the specific rules that form the predicate for § 241(6) claims when violated.
Section 23-1.7 of the Industrial Code addresses protection from general hazards on construction sites. It contains subdivisions covering tripping hazards, falling hazards, overhead hazards, slipping hazards, and other conditions. Some subdivisions (such as 23-1.7(d) on slipping hazards and 23-1.7(e) on tripping hazards) have been held sufficiently specific to support a § 241(6) claim. Others are too general. The specificity analysis applies to each subdivision independently.
Section 23-1.16 of the Industrial Code governs safety belts, harnesses, tail lines, and lifelines on construction sites. It contains specific requirements for the condition, attachment points, and inspection of personal fall protection equipment. Multiple subdivisions of 23-1.16 have been held sufficiently specific to support § 241(6) claims when workers are injured due to the absence or inadequacy of required fall protection.
Not in the traditional sense. You need to prove that a specific Industrial Code provision was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of your injury. You do not need to prove that the defendant acted unreasonably or failed to exercise due care. The violation of the specific provision establishes the duty breach. However, § 241(6) is not absolute liability like § 240: comparative negligence applies, and the defendant can argue the provision was not actually violated.
Yes, if a specific Industrial Code provision governing the condition that caused the slip and fall was violated. Section 23-1.7(d) of the Industrial Code addresses slipping hazards on construction sites and has been held sufficiently specific in certain subdivisions. Section 23-1.7(e) addresses tripping hazards. If the slip or trip occurred in a construction area and violated one of these specific provisions, § 241(6) applies.
Yes. The Industrial Code contains extensive scaffolding regulations at 12 NYCRR 23-5, with specific provisions governing scaffold construction, planking width, guardrail height, load capacity, and access. Many of these subdivisions have been held sufficiently specific to support § 241(6) claims. A scaffolding accident may also support a parallel § 240 claim if it involves a gravity-related hazard.
Yes. Section 23-1.21 of the Industrial Code contains specific provisions governing ladders and ladderways, including requirements for condition, securing, and placement. Violations of specific subdivisions of 23-1.21 support § 241(6) claims. As with scaffolding, a ladder accident may also support a § 240 claim if the worker fell due to the absence or inadequacy of a proper safety device.
The plaintiff can cite multiple Industrial Code provisions in a single § 241(6) claim. Each cited provision is analyzed independently for specificity. If some are upheld as sufficiently specific and others are dismissed as too general, the claim proceeds on the surviving provisions. Multiple proven violations can strengthen the case by demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance at the site.
Yes, if you were performing manual labor as part of construction, demolition, or excavation work. The statute protects persons "employed therein or lawfully frequenting" the work area. Courts have interpreted this language to cover workers regardless of whether they are classified as employees or independent contractors. What matters is the nature of the work being performed, not the contractual relationship.
If the court determines that the cited provision is too general under the Ross specificity test, the § 241(6) cause of action predicated on that provision is dismissed. This is why selecting the right provision at the right subdivision level is critical. An experienced attorney will identify the most specific applicable provision and cite it at the subdivision level rather than the section level. If one provision fails, others may still survive.
The court applies the framework from Ross v. Curtis-Palmer (81 N.Y.2d 494, 1993) and Misicki v. Caradonna (12 N.Y.3d 511, 2009). The provision must set forth a specific, positive command prescribing a concrete standard of conduct. The analysis is performed at the individual subdivision level, not the section level. Courts look at whether the provision mandates a particular action, dimension, or condition rather than stating a general safety objective. This is a question of law decided on motion.
Yes. A § 241(6) claim is itself a third-party action, meaning it is filed against parties other than the worker's direct employer (who is protected by workers' compensation exclusivity). The claim is directed at the property owner, general contractor, or their agents. It runs alongside the workers' compensation case and is the mechanism for recovering full damages beyond what comp provides.
You need evidence establishing three things: that a specific Industrial Code provision was violated, that you were performing construction, demolition, or excavation work when injured, and that the violation caused your injury. Useful evidence includes site photographs, daily inspection logs, OSHA reports, witness statements, the site safety plan, and expert testimony identifying the specific Industrial Code requirements that were not met.
While not legally required, § 241(6) cases involve complex determinations about Industrial Code specificity, expert testimony on safety compliance, coordination with a parallel workers' compensation claim, and defense challenges on comparative negligence. The threshold legal question of whether the cited provision is sufficiently specific is litigated on motion before the case reaches a jury. Construction injury firms handle these cases on contingency, meaning no fee unless recovery is obtained.